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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DARRELL NIELSEN.
Pla1nt1ff.
Case No 19369

vs
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH and DEPARTMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY. and
EDWARD R BEALE.
Defendants

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

NA TlJKI:. OF CA'.>I:.
1111·

.ir1

Jµpt·dl

ut

•I•·• 1 ·"'"

""'J

t111.· deusion

111 "dllt, r.dwJnJ
1 tr

L111·

µursuctnt

to

k.

µursuant to
llo<1rd

ut

~J~-11-lU(i

l<eview,

I, Utah Code Annotated

Industrial

Lrnn111i ssion

ot

l'!~J.

Utah,

of the Administrative Law Judge declaring that the

beale, was an employee of Darrell
S;35-4-2i(J),

Utah

Code Annotated

-1-

Nielsen, the Plain-

1953,

rather than an

DISPO~ITlUN

bELOW

On November 5, 1982 the claimant, Mr. Beale, was notified by the Uepartment of Employment Security

that he was monetarily

ineligible to recei1c

unemployment benefits as a result of his association with F.B. Truck Lines
Mr. Beale filed an appeal against this decision on February 15, 1983 stat 1 r,:
that he was employed by the Plaintiff, not F.B. Truck Lines, during his bas,
period.

In an appeal decision issued on May 3, 1983 the Appeal Referee rule:

that Mr. Beale was an employee of the Plaintiff pursuant to §§35-4-ZZIJllS:,
3~-4-22(p)

and 35-4-4(f) of tile Act and remanded the matter to the Centra

Office for a monetary determination based on this finding.

(A timelineo;

issue with regard to the late-filed appeal was resolved in the claimant';
favor based upon continued contact with the Department Representative
California.)

Jr·

The Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Referee

on July 15, 1983 in Case No. 83-A-1331, 83-BR-33U.
RELIEF SOUGHT UN APPlAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisions of the Board of Review and thE
Appeal keferee.

Defendant seeks affinnation of said decisions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff was the owner of a semi-tractor for which he contracted wit"
F.B. Truck Lines

to haul

various loads,

whatever location they might specify.

-2-

apparently in their trailer1, t·

RUU41 and 0048

Plaintiff also hire'

"' Lf.ct111 consisting of the claimant and another party, who actually
'·'"

cruck.

and UUJl

RUUJu

The claimant and the other driver began

""Y h.1 the Plaintiff on or about June 29, 1981 and last worked on Octo-

ter 4, HG<'..
f
1

11u

Ruul?

.b. Truck Lrnes paid the Plaintiff at a rate of
or

~!.

;nE

J0%

per mile

~.'>J

clain1ant

when

per loaded mile

traveling without a load between hauls.

received $.lb per mile

rur n1 s sen ices as driver.

..•c.

~.65

in 1%1

and $.2U per mile in

The claimant was paid some amounts

RUUD

,, jdva11ces and draws d1 rectly by F .B. Truck Lines; however the net earnings
cuE

tr.c c l11mant were paid from the Plaintiff's account.

n•J

µrefits 111ade by tne Plaintiff on the trucking venture.

wis purchased as a tax write-off.

R0043
RUU44

There were
The truck

RUU51

mly t11c Pla1nti ff, not F .B. Truck Lines, had the discretion to tenninJte \lie cla1111dnt's

services.

ROU44

and 0047

The Plaintiff had "say and

10ntrol" over the truck with regard to seNice and repairs and what sort of
·:•·J·J~

w'Jul d not be hauled

tnc c1"1mant on st:veral
\1Jrcl1aroJesl.

RuU49

1n

the truck.

RU049

The Plaintiff had instructed

occasions not to accept exempt loads (relating to

The Plaintiff could remove the truck from service if he

'''•1oed Dr µut it anywnere he pleased, leaving the claimant with the alter-

·'t; vrcc

of ace ept i ng the change or quitting.

1111

,
1

1,

' ,., '"""L

id1111ant

had

oeen a truck driver for approximately twenty-three

hod never owned his own truck.
contractor.

RU04~

RUlJib

-J-

ROU49

He had never been an in-

ARGUMENT
POINT
IN KEVIEl<ING CERTAIN UETE~l!NATIONS OF THE !NlJUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOY~NT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL
AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS UNUER AJ; INTERMEOIATl STANlJARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT
EVIDENCE ANlJ PROV!OE A REASONABLE AND RATIONAL APPLICATION OF
LAW TO FACT.
The standard

of

review in employer contribution cases,

employment insurance cases,

is confined to questions

Superior Cable Installers, Inc. v.

as in all un-

of law.

As stated in

Industrial ColMlission of Utah,

Utah,

No.

19407, Slip Opinion (S.Ct. Utah, April 18, 1984):
The role of this Court in reviewing the findings of
the Board is limited by U.C.A., 1953, §35-4-lO(i),
which sets forth the standard of review:
"In any Judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the
camnission and the board of review as to the facts if
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions
of 1 aw."
Therefore, i f the findings of the Board of Review
are supported by the evidence, the decision must be
af finned.
This Court,

ruling

on unemployment insurance matters, has consistent!)

held, that where the findings of fact of the Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence they will not be disturbed.

Martinez v. B_oarc

of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P.2d 587 (1970) and Whitney v. Board of Revie•
of Industrial ColMlission of Utah, Utah,

58~

standard has been preserved by this Court
administrative actions.

P.2d

78U

(1978J.

This

same

in

other decisions arising fr~

Milne Truck Line, Inc.

v. Public Service Comm__i_s2l_lln.

Utah, 368 P.2d 590 (1962)

and PB! Freight Service v. Public Service CoTITI 11

sion of Utah, Utah, 598 P .2d 13~2 (197'!).

-4-

''Jtter' before the Court have,
··'"' ,i·1<.hotvmous standard
wt,11 h give

of

in practice, provided

review is

not

instances where

so clearly applicable.

Cases

rise to mixed questions of law and fact have generated an inter-

mediate category of review of administrative decisions upon which the courts
r<eru se a S(Ope of review more extensive than when reviewing agency findings
on questions of basic fact, but less extensive than when reviewing to correct
crrnr

in

agency decisions on questions of general law.

Salt Lake City Corp-

"'a_t._io_n v. Uepartment of Employment Security, Utah, 657 P.2d 1312 (1982).

In

reviewing the a\Jency's decisions in questions of mixed law and fact and the
3ppl1cation of findings of fact to the legal rules governing a case, a court
'..houlo afford great deference to the technical

expertise or rrore extensive

experience of the responsible agency so long as those decisions fall within
trre limits of reasonableness and rationality.

Gray v. Department of Employ-

m~~~-~~u_r:_i_t.r.

Utah, 681 P.2d 807 (1984), City of Orem v. Christensen, Utah,

bb2 P.cd

(19b4J,

i:'.~i:'.

Utah Department of Administrative Services

~i:.l'v_~c~_(,_~n!12_~ssion, Utah,

658 P.2d 601 (1983)

Public

This latter case goes on to

describe that category of review more fully as follows:
Also among these intennediate issues are the Comm1ss1on's decisions on what can be called questions of
"special law." These are the Commission's interpretations of the operative provisions of the statutory law
it is empowered to administer, especially those generalized tenns that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to the responsible agency. In
reviewing agency decisions of this type, we apply what
we have cal led the "time honored rule of law • . • that
the construction of statutes by gover~nental agencies
charged with their administration should be given considerable weight . . . . " McPhie v. Industrial ColTITiission,

-5-

v.

Utah, 5b7 P.Zd l5J, h5 (1977); l<le_s_t ~ordan v. DH9ai)
P:ic1 41 l
.
An agency s 1nterµretat1on of key provisions of the
statute it is empowered to administer is often inseparable frcxn its application of the rules of law to the
basic facts . . .

m~~!_~~E~pl oym~~!_-~~r;:_i_tJt_, Utah, ITb

Reasonableness must al so be determined w1 th reference to the speci fie temi 1
of the underlying legislation and in light of the public policy sought to be
served.

Utah Department of Administrative Services, supra.

The primary pub-

lic policy consideration under the Employment Security Act, as stated in

~l5-

4-L of the Act, is to protect against econCJTii c i nsecu ri ty due to unemployment
which is a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people cf
this state.

Thus it is in the public interest to protect against the crush-

ing blow of unemployment on the worker and his family.

Further, a liberal

construction of the Act in favor of the worker is required to best effectuate
its stated purposes.

Gocke v. l<liesley, 18 Utah 2d 44, 420 P.2d 44

Singer

Co. v. Industrial Commission

Sewing

Placement

and

Mach.

Unemployment

Insurance, 104

U.

175,

of

l

l9bbl;

Utah, Departmen_t__o_i
134 P.Zd 479 119431,

Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, Department of Employment
Security, 7 Utah 2d 113, 320 P.Zd 315 (1958).
When the aecis1on being

reviewed represents the agency's weighing of

competing values to select a particular goal, its interpretation of a special
law, or its application of its findings of fact to a finding or conclusioc
on the "ultimate facts" in the case, Judicial review necessarily involves
independent Judgment of the reasonableness of the agency decision.

,n

Howeve•

the statutory setting in which the decision operates must provide the backdr01·

-6-

Ju<J11.1al

process.

Utah Department of Administrative Services

and

'""''n'j tt1ese pardlneters in mind, the Court should affinn the decision
, f thr

Aµµeal t<eferee if that decision is:
1.

found to be within the parameters defined by the Act;

c:.

supported by competent evidence (which need not be
uncontrad1cted evidence pursuant to Salt Lake City
Corporation, supra.); and

J.

reasonable in its application of the agency's policy
to the facts.

·!avin•j 1net these criteria in its review and decision-making processes, the
8efendant asserts

that

the Court will

Oef ndant sets out the tests utilized
0

in

affirm the Agency's

findings.

The

in reaching its ultimate conclusions

the "Arguments" below which demonstrate the Agency's proper application

Jf fa•.t to law pursuant to the express policy of that body.

POINT JI
UF PERSUNAL SlRVICE FOk It.AGES, PUKSUANT TO THE
ulFIN!TIUNS PROVIDED IN THE ACT, IS THE ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY
F!NuiNu TU FukTHLR UlNSIDlRATIUN OF THE EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT
LUNTRACTOR ISSUE.
Trll ~lKrUKMAi'<Cf.

~laint1ff's
1,,.
1

Drief has raised an issue as to whether the claimant and

o d1 iver were in partnership, thereby precluding any consideration of

1,,.,,, 111J1v1dual ly as emµloyees.

Plaintiff's witness made the following claim

Jt the aµ peal hearing:
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. . . Ed
tracting
speci fie
he is an

and Annette are a team, a partnership, conwith Daryl Nielsen to drive the truck for a
mil age [sic] rate and I question the fact that
employee. R.OCJsZ
Payments were mact

No evidence was presented in support of this assertion.
to each party individually.

R.0044

Expense records gave the full nafl'<:

each driver rather than any partnership name or designation.
pondence was

addressed to the claimant alone

ber 19, 191:l2.
solely to

R.CJU97

individual

R.CJllO

0

Corres

from the Plaintiff on Octo·

The evidence which was presented in this matter point.
employment;

therefore,

consideration

of question or

personal seNice for wages pursuant to the Act is required.
Perfonnance of personal service for wages is predicated on the statuto•:
langua~e

of

~~3~-4-LZ(J)(l)

and

3~-4-Zdp)

of the Act.

~J~-4-Zl(J)(l)

l';Jlc

that:
"lmployment" means any seNice . . . perfonned for wages
or under any contract of hire written or oral, express or
implied.
~35-4-ZZ(p)

defines "wages" as:

. . all renumeration for personal services including
commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all renumeration in any medium other than cash. Gratuities
customarily received by an individual in the course of
his employment fr()l1 persons other than his employing unit
shall be treated as wages received from his employing
unit. The reasonable cash value of renumeration in any
medium other than cash and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be estimated and deten11i ned in accordance
with the rules prescribed by the commission . . .
Those relationships which are excluded from the definitional test fo1 ""'1'
ment must be bona fide lessor-lessee, vendor-vendee or franchise re1dl''
ships as established historically by a long line of cases resolved bef.:•
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lourc.

1,,

v.

F_ul_l_~r____B~u~

Industrial Commission of Utah,

9'1 U.

97, 104

co cul (194U); Singer Sewing Machine, supra; Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v.
IL~ustrid_I_ L_O~Jljnl_s_s_i_o_r:, 9~

r,ilis v.

l_~d_u_strial

of

~l•ar-d

U.

25~.

lUI'.'. P.2d 3U7 (1940); Logan-Cache Knitting

Corrunission, 99 U. l, 1U2 P.2d 495 (1940); Blamires v.

_R_e_v_i~"'__O_f__ _D_e~tment

of Employment Security of

Industrial Commis-

s;on, iHah, 5!:l4 P.2d 889 (1978); Leach v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm1_ss1_on, D_epartment of Employment Security, 123 U. 4l3, 260 P.2d 744 (1953).
il1e inoiv1dual

who gains his income from services performed as an auto mech-

anic, dentist, plurroer, CPA or even as a truck driver, is brought within the
test of

~:i:i-4-22(J)(l)

as rendering personal services for renumeration.

broad application of this test is seen in the language of Fuller Brush,
winch says

in

The

~upra,

part:

A takes to the blacksmith a horse to be shod and a plow
point to be sharpened. The smith renders personal service and receives renumeration for his time and labor,
which constitutes wages under the act.
in our case the claimant drove a truck owned by the Plaintiff, and at the request of the Plaintiff, for pay.

The evidence being sufficient for a finding

r,f Elnploy1,1ent under the definitions of §~35-4-22(J)(l) and 22(p), the first

µhase ot the statutory scheme was completed by the trier of fact.
•sserts that this finding is without error.
r,1n

,,,-

t 11~

t ,-1

tf'st

Defendant

Only after this finding is made,

er of fact proceed through the statutory framework to the three-

provided in ~~3:i-4-22(j)(~)(A),(!l) and (C) to detennine if any of

t,,,. exclusions given there would have proper application to these findings
dna

the r.crnain1ng evidence.

-'I-

POI NT I I I
EACH OF THE THREE CONOITIONS SET FORTH IN §§35-4-22(j)(5)(A),
(B) ANU (C) OF THE ACT, COMMONLY KNOl<IN AS THE "A~C TE~T," FUR
ESTABLISHING INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS MUST BE t>'ET OR THE
SERVICES PERFORMED WILL BE HELD TO BE EMPLOYMENT.
§35-4-2Z(j)(5) provides as follows:
Services perfonned by an individual for wages or under
any contract of hi re, written or oral, express or implied, ana are deemed to be employment subject to this
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of
the comrni ssion that:
(A) The indivioual has been and will continue to be free
from control and direction over the perfor1nance of those
services, both under his contract of hi re and in fact;
(ll) The service is either outside the usual course of
the business for which tt1e service is perfonned or that
the service is perfonmed outside of all of the places of
business of the enterprise for which the service is performed; and

(C) The individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of service.
The exclusion provisions are in the conjunctive.

Therefore, all thm

elernents of the ABC Test must be met in order for services to be exclude'
from coverage as employment under the Act.
Leach, supra.

Superior Cable Installers an,;

Failure to meet the reguirements of any one is sufficient t:

support a finding that the services provided constitute employment.

GloD:

Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Corrvnission, 98 U. 36, 91 P.Zd Sil il9Y'
Some pertinent

characteristics

of

the

claimant in the case at hand are:

-lu-

Plaintiff's

relationship

w1tn

1

11

The claimant was hired to drive the truck by the Plaintiff.

2i

The Plaintiff retained the sole right to discontinue the
claimant's services.

o)

The claimant received load and destination infonnation
from the contract carrier, F.B. Truck Line.

41

~ome

ol

The Plaintiff retained the right to detennine what loads
would or would not be hauled by the claimant.

o)

The Plaintiff exercised his discretion in refusing certain loads on several occasions.

7)

Tne Plaintiff approved maJor repairs on the truck prior
to any work being performed and bore the costs of the
repairs.

bl

The Plaintiff paid the claimant at a flat rate of pay
($.lb per mile when first hired and later $.20 per mile).

9)

The claimant had no stake in the profits of the trucking
enterprise.

lu)

The claimant was paid directly by the Plaintiff when
advances made by the contract carrier to the claimant did
not cover the full amount due pursuant to No. 8 above.

loaas offered by the contract carrier were not profitable due to surcharge problems.

In Rev. Rul. 524, 1971-72 C.B. 346 advice was requested as to whether a
truck driver is an employee of the party leasing a tractor-trailer rig with
a d1·1ver to a contract carrier when the right to direct and control the
driver to the extent necessary to protect the investment is retained by the
lessor.

The following conclusions were drawn:
In the instant case the leasing c001pany owns the
tractor-trailer rigs and leases them with driver; it
furnishes major repairs, tires, ana license plates for
the rigs; it generates all the work or jobs; it bears
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the major expenses and financial risks of the business;
and it hires the driver to perfonn personal services on
a continuing basis. The driver is not engaged in an
independent enterprise requiring capital outlays or the
assumption of business risks, but rather his services
are a necessary and integral part of the leasing company's business. The leasing company has the right to
direct and control the driver to the extent necessary to
protect its investment, and to discharge him if his conduct jeopardizes its contract with the carrier.
Accordingly, it is held that the driver engaged in
perfonni ng services under the circumstances described
above is an employee of the leasing company for the purposes of the Federal Contributions Act, the Federal Unemµl oyment Tax Act, and the Collection of Income Tax at
Source on Wages.
There are several pertinent excerpts from the testimony in the case at ha110
which it is now appropriate to review.
nature of

the claimant's working

The first of these demonstrates the

relationship with

the Plaintiff as lon;

term and precluding the possibility of other work during the same period b:1
its full-time nature:
Referee:

. . ..tien did you first start working for
Nielsen Enterprises?

Claimant:

Ah, June 20, officially June 29, 1981.

Referee:

Okay, and then the last day of employment we
have October 4, 191:Ji:'., are we correct?

Claimant:

That is correct?

Referee:

What type of work were you doing?

Claimant:

I was driving.

Referee:

And your rate of pay?

Claimant:

In 198I it was 16 cents a mile, in 1982 it was
20 cents a mile.

[sicj
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Referee:

All right, and you were a full-time employee?

Claimant:

Yes, m'am.

R.0027

1n,_ cla1111ant l1as a long history of work of this nature:
Referee:

. . • Now have you ever been a truck owner or
ever done this on your own?

Claimant:

No m'am.

Referee:

Okay.

Clai1nant:

Yes m' am.

Referee:

How long have you been driving?

Claiamnt:

Oh, approximately 23 years.

Have you al ways driven for someone else?

R.0048

It was the claimant's understanding that he had been "hired" by the Plaintiff

and that the Plaintiff alone had the authority to tenninate his services:
Referee:

• • • If F. and B. [contract carrier] had been
displeased with you as a driver, would they
have been able to tenninate your relationship?

Claimant:

They would have notified the owner of the
tractor that they wanted me tenni natea, is
what they would have done.

Referee:

Ana then the tenni nation would have been done
by whom?

Claimant:

By the person who hired me, Mr. Nielsen
[Plaintiff]. R.0047

1'la;11t1ft's accountant concurred in this authority:
Referee:

Who would have the right to fire either
Berle [sic] Lclaimant] or Si11UTis?

Plaintiff's Accountant: Well Daryl [Plaintiff] would be
the only one that would have had any right to
do that as far as I know. R.0044
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With regara to control

over the actual

work perfonned the follow 1 fl'J

1

significant:
Referee:

. . . Then ah, who gave the directions of
where you were to go and what you were supposed to do in tenns of loads?

Claimant:

Ah, dispatching and loading orders came from
F.B. TrucKlines Lsic] Lcontract carrier].

Referee:

Okay, did Mr. Nielsen [Plaintiff] have anything to do with that at all?

Claimant:

Not as far as dispatching and such. Now he
could, at his discretion, tell us certain
loads that he would not want us to take . .
R.UU48

Plaintiff's Accountant: Ed [claimant], at any time did
Daryl [Plaintiff] request you not to take a
load?
Claimant:

Yes he did Orin, ah, several times he asked
me not to take exempt loads. R.0049

Not only did the Plaintiff have the right to control which jobs the claimant
might perfonn, but this right was exercised on several occasions.
Monies due the claimant for his work were covered in part by advance 1
made by F.B. Truck Lines, but any balance due was paid by the Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Accountant: Wel 1 he [Plaintiff] put the
money in the bank account and paid the bills
out of it like the truck payments, the insurance and then occasionally he'd pay Ed [claimantJ or Simm some amount that they claimed
they had coming. R.UU44

Referee:

And how were your checks made out?
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Claimant:

The checks, ..tien I received them I was usually
going through Salt Lake City and they would be
made out to me and I would usually cash then
right on the spot.

Referee:

What was the name of the company on the check?

Claimant:

Ah, it is run from, as I stated, from Daryl
Nielsen's [Plaintiff's) personal account to
Daryl Neilsen truck account, ah, Nielsen
Enterprises, ah, let's see, DN land development in Ogden, Utah. And I have been paid in
cash at times. R.0027 and 0028

P.epai rs to be made on the truck were handled as follows:
Claimant:

. . . If the truck needed repairs I could not
authorize the 11YJneys [sic) to pay for any repairs. That had to come fr~TI either Mr. Alexander [Plaintiff's accountant) or Mr. Neilsen
[Plaintiff]. F.B., while they were in essence
handling the running of the truck, it was at
the owners [sic] discretion at any time he
wished to he could remove the truck from
F.B. 's service, he could put the truck anywhere he wanted to put the truck. My option
was 1 could either go where he put the tractor
or 1 could quit and get off the tractor and go
look for work elsewhere. R.OU4'i

Considering the characteristics observed in this employment situation and enurnerJted

on page 11 of this point plus the testimony reviewed above, an almost

identical case to that in Rev. Rul. 524, supra, is presented by the case at
hand.
Other similar fact situations have given rise to case law on point here.
In

H~rry_J:_._Young

and Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah, 538 P.2d 316 (1975), this

Court u1stinguished the enployer/employee relationship from that of an indere'ldent

contractor in holding that the employee is hired, paid a fixed salary

-15-

or rate and is subJ ect to a greater degree of control in the perfo nnance of
his duties

than

is the

independent contractor who

is engaged to do

10 ,"

particular project or piece of work, usually for a set sum and is respon 11 o1e
only for satisfactory completion of the task.
that the

furnishing

of

equipment,

The Court went on to point out

particularly expensive equipment, has,

significant bearing upon the issue of retention of control by the employer.
This language has brought us precisely to the "control
elaborated in the "A Test" of §35-4-22(j)(5).

and direction"

Comparing the Court's

findi~s

to the present factual scenario, it is apparent that the relationship between
the Plaintiff and the claimant is one of employment as affinnatively assertEd
by hiring, firing and pay practices and in tenns of investment.

This findrnq

is further supported by this Court's decision in Kinne v. Industrial Cofllllis·
~ion,

Utah, bU9 P .~d 92b ( l9t!CJ) where the truck driver was al so found to be

the employee of the truck owner-lessor.
As a further consideration under the "A Test", it has been noted that:
The most important factor to be considered in detennining whether an arrangement between a principal and
another person for the perfonnance of work creates an
employer-employee relationship between them is whether
the principal has the right to control the manner in
which the other µerson perfonns the work in question.
Mori sh v. United States, 5~5 F.2d 794 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
In the above case the fact that the plaintiff exercised his right of co~trc:
in a broaa sense by only generally ironitoring the activities of his true·
drivers did not militate against the existence of the right of contro·1, Pd'
ticularly as the nature of the work involved did not require, or even pennit

-lb-

,,, 1

much actual

supervision by the plaintiff.

Again precedent case law has

1csolved a comparable fact situation in favor of an employer/employee relationship.
The "~ fest" sets forth a perplexing alternative situation whereby either
of

tt10

staws.

elements would result in a finding favorable to independent contractor

To reiterate the statute, the individual

is held to be an indepen-

Jent contractor if the service provided is outside the usual course of business or it the service is perfonned outside all of the places of business of
the enterprise

for

which the

working environment,
test.

thereby

service is perfonned.
increasing

the

A truck

complexity

of

is

a mobile

applying

this

In ~lamir~, supra, the "B Test" was satisfied because Blamires per-

fonned his services outside any places of business which his principal had
previously maintained or which were utilized for any purpose except Blamires'

As distinguished
within the physical

fran

Blamires,

facility,

this claimant perfonned his

services

the truck itself, provided by the Plaintiff.

Jt1l1zation of the facility served both the Plaintiff and the claimant in
Lenns of financial
,1lity remained

gains.

At the end of the claimant's services, the fa-

in the hands of the Plaintiff, as further evidence of em-

µlJyment pursuant here to the "B Test".
1. n

111.j1vidual

11cl1eu trade,

who

is customarily engaged in an

independently estab-

profession, occupation or business meets the criteria for ex-

, lus1on as an iooeperldent contractor under the "C Test" of §35-4-22(J)(5).
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The statute

is

interpreted

to

mean

neither

"independently

engaged

in,

established business" nor "customarily engaged in an independent busine 11 .
Fuller Brush Co., supra.

As correctly interpreted in Fuller Brush:

The adverb "independently" clearly modi fies the word
"established", and must therefore carry the meaning
that the "business" or "trade" was established independently of the employer or the rendering of personal
service fonTiing the basis of the claim.
As in Superior Cablevision,
other than the Plaintiff.

supra., this claimant did not work
The claimant had no ownership or

terest in the Plaintiff's trucking

for anyone

proprieta~ i~

venture that he could have transferreG

to another for value.
The good wil 1, if any, attaching to this venture inured to the benefit
of the Plaintiff rather than the claimant.
able part of the business venture.

The claimant was but a replace-

As held in Leach, supra, and particular!,

applicable to the present claimant, the clairnants:
. . . had nothing aside from their relationship with the
plaintiffs. When the services of a dealer were terminated by the plaintiffs, he became unemployed and had to
secure employment elsewhere. He had no business of his
own to fall back on--a business established independently
of his relationship with the plaintiffs and from which
his services for the plaintiffs emanated, a business in
which he was customarily engaged aside from his relationship with the plaintiffs.
If the truck were removed from the claimant's use, he would have been ler:
without tools or equipment to perform his trade, other than his basic driv ·
skill which certainly alone cannot be construed to com)Jrise an independen' 1 •
established business.

Even ownership of the

-HJ-

truck

by

the worker

1°

n1'

,,,,,essar1ly indicative of an independent contractor relationship rather than
,,, ""µlayer/employee relationship.
1JYJil, North_Alabama Motor Exp.

v.

See Showers v. Lund, Neb. 242 N.W.258
Whiteside, Ala.,

169

So.

335 (1936);

lex_as_Em_)l_loyer's Ins. Asso. v. Owen, Tex., 298 S.W.542 (1927) and Annot., 120
A.L k. lUJl, 1U52 et. seq.

The evidence here does not show the claimant to

r1ave haa an independently established business to rely on when separated from
the Pl a inti ff.

Having exhausted each test, not merely one of the three as required by
precedent, and upon finding in each case sufficient evidence to support a
,_onclus1on of employment, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff was in
fact the employer of the claimant for the proper application of unemployment
111suronce law.
CONCLUSION
A thorough analysis

of the facts presented and statutes applicable to

this case has been made at each level of review by the Commission pursuant
to historically

established principles

handed down

by this

Court.

The

Appt<ll Referee and the Board of Review ruled without error in the findings,
supported by suostanti al and competent evidence, that the Plaintiff employed
the claimant and that such employment was not suoject to exclusion from the
c 1 vPru 1ic of

the AeC Test set forth in

~35-4-22(J)(5)

of the Act.

The deci-

1u11 ot the Lom1111ssion, that the Plaintiff is liable for contributions to the
unemploy111ent insurance fund on behalf of the claimant, should be affirmed
uy this

Lou rt.
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September, 1Yb4.
DAVID L. VllLKINSON
Attorney General
K. AL LAN ZABEL

Special Assistant

By

Attorney

GAnera:

----cTilda Vlheat Gowaty
Attorney for Defendant
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Darrell
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844UL, this 5th day of September, 1984.
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